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Abstract
It is extremely important to understand the concept of “Wuxu Zhuyi” (務虚主義
ideologism) when discussing Chinese foreign policy. How are Xu (virtual) and 
Shi  (actual) represented in Chinese foreign policy? Expressions and actions such 
as “saving face” (面子 mianzi), “high-handed diplomacy” and “arrogant attitude” 
are common in descriptions of China’s diplomatic behavior. These behaviors are 
based on this principle of Wuxu Zhuyi. Diplomacy directly connected to national 
interests should be understood as Wushi Zhuyi （務実主義） and includes securing 
resources and the enhancement of national power. In this article, by briefly 
reviewing the diplomatic history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 
1949, the author observes that China’s diplomatic style based on Wuxu Zhuyi is 
mainly concerned with a strategy of “positioning” relative to other nations without 
necessarily relating directly to practical benefits, and is another important element 
of foreign policy behavior . 
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Introduction
One Chinese expert in foreign policy said, “one of the major characteristics of 
China’s foreign policy is mutual collaboration between “Wushi Zhuyi” (Pragmatism) 
and principles of foreign policy.”1 However, in many cases it seems more 
1 Tingbiao Hong and Zhirong Zhang, Dangdai zhongguo waijiao xinlun [New Discussion on 
Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Lizhi Press, 2004), 65.
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appropriate to call it “Wuxu Zhuyi” (ideologism) rather than Wushi Zhuyi when 
observing the diplomacy of Mao Zedong. First, let us define Wushi. “Shi” (actual) 
is used in comparison with “Xu” (virtual), or rather, it stands as the antithesis of Xu. 
Xu refers to substances that cannot be seen or physically touched but actually exist, 
including politics, philosophies, theories or styles (attitudes). On the other hand, 
Shi refers to substances that can be captured with the eye, including the economy 
and other phenomena seen in daily life such as GDP, the price of goods, trade, 
finance, profit and destruction of the environment. “Wu” means “to make an effort 
to deliver a work or to do a job.” Such terms as “Wuxuhui” (ideological meeting) 
and “Wushihui” (pragmatic meeting) are often used for meetings of the Communist 
Party of China. The former refers to meetings about theoretical works – politics, 
philosophies, and behaviors – while the latter refers to the meetings concerning 
more tangible matters – growth strategy, price policy and environmental issues. 
   It is extremely important to understand the concept of Xu when discussing 
Chinese politics. For example, Mao Zedong’s statements and articles had significant 
influence during his time but qualifying them as the matters of Shi would lead to 
serious misconceptions. One typical misunderstanding is the Cultural Revolution. 
Despite Mao’s claim that “The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a great 
revolution that touches people to their very soul and constitutes a new stage in 
the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a deeper and more 
extensive stage” (The Sixteen Points: Guidelines for the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution), in reality it was but destruction rife with “starvation, fear and violence.” 
However, Mao devoted himself to the “Cultural Revolution as Xu” to impress and 
awe people within and outside of the country. In that sense, it had an objective 
significance. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai orchestrated “China, Superpower as Xu” 
in pivotal phases such as the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-US rapprochement.  
   Then, how are Xu and Shi represented in diplomatic actions? We often see 
behaviors such as “saving face” (mianzi), “high-handed diplomacy” and  “arrogant 
attitude” in the descriptions of China’s diplomatic actions. The country even claims 
to economically support the “Third World” despite the fact that China itself is a 
poor nation. These diplomatic actions are based on the principle of Wuxu Zhuyi 
while the diplomacy that directly connects to national interests should be understood 
as Wushi Zhuyi. The latter includes securing resources and the enhancement of 
national power. Diplomatic behavior based on Wuxu Zhuyi is mainly about the act 
of “positioning” in relation to other nations and is not directly related to practical 
benefits, yet it is still an important element of diplomatic actions. 
51. Principle of Diplomatic Action Philosophy
1)  Criteria for Judgment in Diplomatic Actions: Form and Benefit
Through my past studies on China, I came to consider that their basic criteria for 
judgment are “form（型）” and “benefit（利）,” and it is necessary to understand 
their essence and relationship to understand the behavior of Chinese people. First, 
the relationship between “form” and “Xu,” as well as that between “benefit” and 
“Shi” should be explained. I believe that the goal of practicing Xu is to realize “form.” 
Therefore, the diplomacy of Wuxu should be seen as “the diplomacy of form” whose 
goal is to achieve a desirable form by directly interfering with diplomatic principles, 
positioning and the attitude of the country. On the other hand, the goal of practicing 
Shi is the realization of “benefit.” The diplomacy of Wushi should be understood 
as “the diplomacy of benefit,” the diplomacy closely related to national interests 
including economic benefit, maritime interests such as energy and cooperation for 
security.  
The behavior of Japanese people may be similarly understood through these 
criteria of “form” and “benefit.” Move to the Western or Islamic worlds, though, 
and  this form might equate to more religious “values” or ideologies. When 
comparing Chinese and Japanese, both have the same criteria of “form” and 
“benefit,” and even seem to have common behaviors at a glance. However, their 
essence differs. Chinese “form” is shaped by authority or authoritative relations 
and frameworks. Meanwhile, Japanese “form” is shaped by systems, norms, 
rules and procedures. Of course Japan was historically influenced by traditional 
Chinese culture, especially Confucian philosophy, so I would not say that this 
Chinese-style authoritarian concept is completely absent in Japan. However, 
there is a blend of multiple philosophies in Japan that incorporates the ancient 
Japanese view of nature, Buddhist philosophy and modern Western philosophy. 
In its development, Confucian philosophy was relativized, digested and absorbed. 
“Buke Shohatto” (Laws for the Military Houses) and “Kuge Shohatto” (Code 
for Emperor and Court Nobles) in the Edo period can be described as the 
institutionalization of relativized authority. Tamotsu Aoki’s theory is convincing in 
the sense that it claims Japan is a “super-flat” society based on “blended culture.”2 
Therefore, “form” is not an authoritative framework in a super-flat society, but 
systems, norms, rules and procedures have more significance.  
On the other hand, recognition of authority and the consequential formation of 
2 Yasushi Aoki, “Nicchu ‘bunkaryoku’ no jidai” [Japan and China - The Era of “Cultural 
Power”], in Satoshi Amako, ed., Nicchu “ rekishi no kawarime” wo tenbo suru [Outlook of 
“Historical Change” in Japan and China] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2013), 37.
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positions are prioritized in China, although systems and norms are not completely 
ignored. The relationship between the emperor and kings/retainers, Hua (China) 
and Yi (barbarians) and Huayi ( 華夷 ) order based on that are the typical examples 
of “form” based on an authoritative hierarchy. (The traditional view of order will 
be described later in this article.) 
The tendency to build diplomatic relationships based upon such an authoritarian 
concept was observed even after the foundation of the People’s Republic of 
China. China started to insist on the “Three Worlds” theory in the 1970s, and 
defined itself as the leader of the Third World of Asia and Africa that would 
oppose the control of the First World (US and Soviet). They tried to take specific 
diplomatic actions based on this arrangement. Also, they decided to launch the 
Sino-Vietnamese war in February of 1979 on the grounds that it should “punish” 
Vietnam for damaging the long-standing authoritative relations and ideology. 
While the original purpose of war is to weaken a hostile country’s national 
interests or power, China’s objective differed in this case. In other words, its 
purpose was not based on the pursuit of actual personal benefit. 
Let us move on to the comparison between Japan and China in terms of 
“benefit.” Japanese are said to have the tendency to position or recognize the 
self with a strong consciousness of others. One example of this trait is the way 
farmers plant rice, forming a line and planting rice while being mindful of the 
people next to them. It is also reflected in elementary and middle school education 
in which emphasis is placed on the group mentality; children are taught to value 
“doing something with others” and “playing a role in a big group.” Whether it is 
conscious or unconscious, Japanese people assume that there is a community or 
symbiotic space in which they can feel comfortable or find a sense of purpose. 
They are altruistic in the sense that any personal benefit is considered with a 
consciousness of others. Ruth Benedict once used the phrase “shame culture” in 
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword to refer to a code of conduct that defines the 
self within the existence of others.3
Meanwhile, although village societies also existed in China, their basic 
characteristics differed from Japan’s.4 local communities did not develop much 
3 Ruth Benedict, Kiku to katana – Nihon bunka no kata [The Chrysanthemum and the Sword – 
Patterns of Japanese Culture], trans. Matsuharu Hasegawa (Tokyo: Gendai kyoyo bunko A501, 
1967). Of course, Benedict’s point of view is not completely valid in discussing Japanese 
behavioral principles today since rural communities have already collapsed and personal rela-
tions have changed with the progress of industrialization, urbanization and informatization. 
However, it remained an important reference at least until the 1970s or 1980s.
4 Tamotsu Tahara, “Sonraku tochi to sonmin jichi – Dentoteki kenryoku kozo karano apuro-
chi” [Village Government and Villager’s Autonomy – Approach from a Traditional Power 
Structure], in Amako and Hishida, ed., Shinso no chugoku shakai [The Deep Structure of 
Chinese Society] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2000), Chapter Three.
7in North China and South China because of repeated wars in the North and an 
outflow of people abroad in the South. Instead, communities were created in the 
form of personal networks through connections of families, relatives and other 
close relationships. They still exist as mutual cooperative “Quanzi” (圏子 , social 
circles) to this day.5
Then, what are the relationships between “form” and “benefit” in these two 
countries? In China, elites and ordinary people see them in a different balance. 
The former put more emphasis on “form” and the latter finds “benefit” more 
important. Confucius wrote in The Analects that “a gentleman does not think how 
he is going to make a living,” and this is an example of the former. Of course it is 
only a general propensity, and the elements of both form and benefit exist in both 
groups. Basically, “benefit” should be obtained through individual efforts, but it 
is also important to establish a special “relationship” with people in power as a 
means to obtain “benefit.” Abiding by rules and regulations does not assure one 
will gain benefits. 
On the other hand, in Japan, rules and procedures are basic principles although 
it is not meaningless to establish relationships with authority to realize benefits. 
For example, if a student wants to enter a famous university in order to realize his/
her personal benefit, he/she must take an entrance exam – symbolic of a procedure 
based on a rule – and having a relationship with the president of the university 
would not necessarily do him/her a favor. (Rather, there is a risk of being 
considered a fraud.) Through such a process, he/she eventually joins a normative 
community of the university. The above discussion is represented in the following 
diagram.
Figure 1: Comparison between Japan and China 
Source: Author 　
5 Shigeto Sonoda, Chugokujin no shinri to kodo [Behavior and Psychology of Chinese] (Tokyo: 
NHK Books, 2001).
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2)  Diplomatic Actions from the Perspective of “Form and Benefit” and “Xu 
   and Shi”
How should we see the relationships between “form” and Xu, and “benefit” and 
Shi? I already explained the concept for each, and would like to repeat that Xu 
is abstract and invisible (philosophies, theories, laws, styles) and the ultimate 
goal of Xu is “form.” For example, it is “style” at the individual level, and the 
political system at the state level. Meanwhile, the goal of practicing Shi, which is 
visible and concrete (economy, living, discrepancy, military), is to gain or obtain 
something. The goal of Shi is benefit. For example, the goal of economic Shi is 
to realize benefits such as economic growth (rise in GDP). Increased armaments 
would realize the enhancement of military power and active diplomacy would 
bring the benefit of energy resource acquisition. 
With regard to the relationship between “form and “benefit,” “benefit” affects 
“form” in the sense that enhanced national power as a result of increased benefit 
could change the positioning of a country. With rapid emergence and enhanced 
national power, China’s diplomacy today has changed dramatically from that of 
the Deng Xiaoping period when the country positioned itself as a “small country” 
and maintained the policy of “Taoguang Yanghui” ( 韜光養晦, hiding one’s 
brilliance and biding one’s time). China’s “diplomacy of form” is vastly different 
in today’s Xi Jinping period when it has significantly gained national power and 
is pressing the “G2” dynamic. However, form does not simply correlate with 
national power but should be formulated by objective domestic/international 
situational recognition and subjective self-recognition including visions of 
the future, the ideal state of the nation, historical experiences and traditional 
philosophies.
Based on the above discussion, I would like to illustrate characteristics of 
diplomatic actions of the leaders of the People’s Republic of China with regard 
to form and benefit in the chart below. However, first I would like to make some 
comments on the period of the Republic of China. The period of the Republic of 
China can be regarded as the time when both form and benefit were downplayed 
because of the long-term internal turmoil and repeated invasions by superpowers. 
In Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)’s China’s Destiny, published in March 1943 and 
republished in January 1944 with revisions and additions, he described the modern 
history after the Opium War as the period of “national shame,” stating, “In this 
nearly one hundred years, China’s national power weakened and the people were 
dispirited. Such emergency is unprecedented in the past 5,000 years. The fields 
necessary for the survival of the people were greatly damaged, and the vitality of 
the nation and people was lost because of the suppression and binding of unequal 
treaties. The foundation of revival was destroyed in many areas and the root of 
9reconstruction was about to be eradicated.”6 This is the very situation in which 
Chen Qimao (former director, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies), 
who was once considered the senior advisor of Deng Xiaoping in diplomacy, 
articulated, “weak countries do not have diplomacy.”7
As discussed above, “diplomacy of benefit” aims to prioritize and realize 
concrete national interests including security, economic development and the 
securement of energy resources in a realistic manner, in some cases by force. On 
the other hand, “diplomacy of form” is concerned with establishing a country’s 
position in relation to other countries by exploiting certain diplomatic attitudes 
or behaviors, or forcing other countries to do so in some cases. How can China’s 
historical diplomatic practices be explained from this angle?
      Form―Light    Form―Heavy
Benefit―Light
  Period of the Republic of China
 (Theory of “Small countries 
 do not have diplomacy”)
  Mao Zedong Period 
 (Diplomacy of Revolution)
Benefit―Heavy
  Period of Deng Xiaoping
 (Taoguangyanghui)
  Period of Xi Jinping
(Superpower Oriented)
  Table 1: Patterns of Chinese Foreign Policy Behaviors 
  Source: Author
3) “Diplomacy of Form and Benefit” of Mao Zedong
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s 
diplomacy was controlled by Mao Zedong and supported by Zhou Enlai until 
1976. In retrospect, while under Mao’s control until the late 1970s, China had 
been an extremely poor country, maintaining or dropping below the economic 
standard of the early 1950s. Its military was obsolete with rare exceptions of the 
successful atomic bomb test in 1964 and hydrogen bomb test in 1967.
Given this, why was China able to enjoy such spectacular diplomacy that 
garnered attention from all over the world? It would be difficult to find the 
answer looking only at the “actual power” of the country. What China did was 
play the role of a superpower based on Xu while in an extremely fragile situation 
in terms of Shi. In other words, it executed “diplomacy of form” in favor of the 
practical “diplomacy of benefit.” Of course, the presence of excellent “actors” 
like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai was the biggest contributor to the success of 
6 Jieshi Jiang, Chugoku no meiun [China’s Destiny], Japanese edition (Tokyo: Nippon 
Hyoronsha, 1946), 16.
7 Fumio Ito, 21 seiki no chugoku, [China in the Twenty-first Century] (Simul Press, 1995), 4.
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the “diplomacy of form.” However, it should be noted that such diplomatic action 
of China was the manifestation of its traditional philosophy which distinguishes 
“form” from “benefit” and Xu from Shi.
Let us consider the so-called Cold War between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. In February 1950, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance 
and Mutual Assistance was concluded, and China set “Xiangsu Yibiandao” (learn 
everything from the Soviet Union) as its basic foreign policy until the launch of 
the Great Leap Forward, as is widely known. The country’s most imminent issue 
was how the newborn People’s Republic of China would survive in a severe 
international environment. Mao Zedong decided to side with the Soviet Union 
although he did not truly trust Stalin. This was the result of protecting “benefit,” 
which was national security. However, China made it clear that the country 
regarded itself as superior to other socialist countries including those in Eastern 
Europe, as was discussed above. China tried to give the impression that it directly 
followed the Soviet Union by calling them “Laodage (老大哥)” (respectable eldest 
son), and itself “Laoer” (second eldest son). This diplomatic attitude implies the 
country’s obsession with “form.”
In 1954, Socialist China and Capitalist India agreed on the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence in the talk between Zhou Enlai and Nehru. In the 
following year of 1955, this idea was further developed in the first Asian-African 
Conference, also known as the Bandung Conference. Zhou reportedly grabbed the 
spotlight in the conference. The movement of the Bandung Conference eventually 
developed into the Non-Aligned Movement, which avoided taking either side of 
the United States or Soviet Union. Why did China’s leadership take such an action 
in this time of seeming harmony within the Sino-Soviet relationship? Oddly, this 
question has gone mostly overlooked in the past. However, according to a study 
of recent years, Mao said to the party’s leadership that the achievement of the 
Bandung Conference was the development of the Intermediate Zone Theory.8 Mao 
revisited the Intermediate Zone Theory in 1959 during the Great Leap Forward 
amidst aggravation of the Sino-Soviet split. In 1964, when the Sino-Soviet split 
had reached a point of inevitability, he proposed the theory to the world again, 
taking on a new, flamboyant tone in an editorial in People’s Daily. This marked a 
clear change in his attitude.
Mao did not want to recognize the Cold-War framework – which highlighted 
the United States and the Soviet Union – when he started advocating the 
Intermediate Zone Theory in 1946. However, with no choice but to depend on 
the Soviet Union in matters of national security, and unable to challenge Socialist 
8 Jun Niu, “Chongjian ‘zhongjian didai’: Zhongguo yazhou zhengce diyuan qi, 1949-1955” 
[Reconstruction of the “Intermediate Zone”: Origin of China’s Asia Policy], Guoji zhengzhi 
yanjiu [International Political Studies], Vol. 2 (2012): 64-66.
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leader Stalin, he accepted the framework. He secretly ranked himself and China 
second. However, after Stalin passed, Khrushchev took power and started to seek 
out a route to peaceful coexistence with the United States. In this climate Mao 
sought an opportunity to sell China as a supporter of a World Revolution with 
himself as the leader, replacing Khrushchev who had given up on the revolution 
and was less experienced with it. He probably saw the memorial ceremony to 
mark the 40th anniversary of the Russian Revolution in November of 1957 as 
the perfect stage, as it was there that Mao made the famous speech “Dongfeng 
Yadao Xifeng” (the Eastern socialist regimes prevails over the Western capitalist 
regimes). It was as if he was deriding Khrushchev for being inclined toward 
peaceful coexistence of the US and the Soviet Union. In this regard, the Great 
Leap Forward was a policy designed to achieve his ambition by enhancing wealth 
and military power.   
While the Soviet Union “gave in to the US and sought for coexistence,” Mao 
concluded that China had to be the center of Asian, African and Latin American 
nations that would advocate anti-US imperialism and the People’s Liberation 
Movement. On January 20, 1965, right before the Cultural Revolution, he called 
for the creation of the “foundation of the second United Nations.” Furthermore, 
in July 1967 amidst the Cultural Revolution, he clarified his position as “the 
center of World Revolution” by insisting, “Our country should become not 
only the political center of World Revolution, but also the military center of the 
revolution…the arsenal of World Revolution.”9 He actively supported struggles 
in Indochina including the Vietnam War, struggles in Africa including those in the 
Congo and Algeria and struggles in Latin America during the Cultural Revolution, 
and invited leaders of those countries to Beijing to showcase himself as the leader 
of the People’s Movement around the world. It was the epitome of “diplomacy of 
form,” and the opposite of “diplomacy of benefit.”  
Mao’s “diplomacy of form” was systematized as the Three Worlds Theory 
presented in the meeting with Zambian President Kaunda in February 1974. He 
argued that the most revolutionary world power was the group of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America (the Third World), which stood against the superpowers of the US 
and the Soviet Union (the First World) that were virtually controlling the world. 
He positioned China as the leader of the Third World of developing countries. 
Deng Xiaoping officially announced the Three Worlds Theory to the world in the 
Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in April of the 
same year. This means that Mao Zedong and China voluntarily discarded the Cold 
War structure that had come to be commonly accepted in international society 
9 Motakuto siso banzai, ge [Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, Volume 2], Japanese edition 
(Tokyo: San-ichi Shobo, 1975), 397.
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after World War II. At the same time, he made it clear that China should stand 
as the center of the anti-hegemonism struggle (struggle against the superpowers 
of the US and the Soviet Union) initiated by the Third World. In other words, he 
practiced “diplomacy of form.” 
However, of course Mao did not practice “diplomacy of form” alone. The most 
significant events during this time were Nixon Shock, the visit of US President 
Nixon to Beijing and subsequent Sino-US rapprochement in a meeting with 
Mao Zedong that took the world by surprise. It was certain that the Sino-Soviet 
relationship only worsened following the Sino-Soviet military clashes at Zhenbao 
Island in March 1969, and China even accused the Soviet Union of “social 
imperialism.” Still, many were shocked when socialist China joined hands with 
the US, the leader of capitalist nations and the greatest enemy of the country, and 
tried to topple the socialist Soviets. This event took place in 1972 when there was 
no prospect of the end of the Vietnam War, the symbol of anti-US imperialism and 
the People’s Liberation Movement. Amidst this, Mao invited President Nixon to 
Beijing and Sino-US rapprochement was under way. 
What explains this behavior? It signified “diplomacy of benefit.” China wanted 
to confront the Soviet Union, the superpower directly threatening its security 
and standing as the “center of the revolution” of the Third World. It seems as if 
“diplomacy of benefit” is based on all-out realism. As has often been discussed, 
Mao’s diplomacy at the time followed the logic “the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend.” It was thorough realism, caring not whether both countries supported 
socialism or whether they had an “alliance” in form. 
However, it would be misleading to rule that Mao Zedong’s diplomacy had 
little or no ideological element based on the conclusions above. As was pointed 
out in the beginning of this article, Chinese and Japanese did not have strong 
ideological values based on the Western definition. However, replace the word 
“ideology” with Xu or “form” and it would be clear that China’s diplomatic 
actions cannot be simply explained by realism. Let it be repeated again that the 
above diplomatic action of Mao was actually the practice of “diplomacy of form,” 
and its all-out realism was based on its positioning, which is form, defined by the 
Intermediate Zone Theory and Three Worlds Theory. 
4) Deng Xiaoping’s Diplomatic Actions from the Perspective of Form and 
  Benefit
How should we see the diplomacy of Deng Xiaoping in comparison with that of 
Mao? He was also obsessed with form. Deng Xiaoping made his intentions to 
preserve Mao’s policies in diplomacy clear by proudly making a speech on the 
Three Worlds Theory in the UN meeting in 1974 directly following his comeback. 
In the late 1980s, he called for the establishment of a “new international political 
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and economic order” and advocated the theory of “Dasanjiao” (大 三 角 grand 
triangle) in which China, the US and the Soviet Union were the three biggest and 
most influential countries that would promote the new order. However, talk of this 
Dasanjiao theory disappeared in time.
Deng Xiaoping’s subsequent remarks and actions suggest that he took up 
the practice of Shi with the “diplomacy of benefit.” His remarks right after the 
Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 clearly represent his beliefs, which eventually 
became the basic attitude of Chinese diplomacy. Deng did not directly confront 
or argue against developed Western countries that harshly condemned him 
for the “suppression of democracy and human rights” and imposed economic 
sanctions. He showed the attitude of “Taoguang Yanghui,” which would become 
the key word of his diplomacy, by saying, “I will not change the route of reform 
and openness” and “Peace and development are diplomatic policies to stick to.” 
However, he expressed a sense of humiliation at the same time in remembering 
the treatment after the Boxer Rebellion, saying, “members of the countries that 
joined the economic sanction are the same ones as the eight allied countries 
of Boxer Protocol with the only changes from the Netherlands to Canada and 
Austria-Hungary to Australia.” It is clear that he perceived the reactions of those 
developed countries with a strong sense of nationalism as a Chinese citizen.10
Deng clearly changed his positioning during the rapid changes in international 
politics from 1989 to 1991 when the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and Iraq War took place. This change of positioning was articulated 
in a “24-character” guideline and represented the diplomacy of Taoguang Yanghui. 
Around the same time, he further clarified his positioning with the “12-character” 
guideline (Bing Lin Cheng Xia, Di Qiang Wo Ruo, Yi Shou Wei Zhu , 兵臨城下、
敵強我弱、以守為主 , as the castle was besieged by the enemy which is far more 
stronger than us, we need to adopt a defense-oriented strategy). He recognized that 
he was in a “weak” position and decided to adopt the “diplomacy of benefit” by 
thoroughly practicing Taoguang Yanghui. The “benefit” he sought was economic 
development and modernization, and he promoted the reform and opening policies 
in order to pursue them.
In the 1990s when it became more and more obvious that the Cold War was 
over, China started to emphasize a so-called “Multipolar Theory” that laid out the 
characteristics of the international structure and a guideline for future international 
affairs. In parallel with that, it often put forward the diplomacy guideline that 
“All nations are fair, reasonable and equal. It does not matter if they are big or 
small, strong or weak, rich or poor.” Another practice of multipolarization is the 
10 Xiaoping Deng, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, di san juan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 
Volume 3] (Beijing: People Press, 1993), 358.
China’s Diplomatic Philosophy and View of the International Order in the 21st Century
14 The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol.3, No. 2
partnership diplomacy among superpowers that China actively insisted upon and 
practiced from the mid to late 1990s. Both of these diplomatic guidelines were 
devised to position the country as “weak” and confront the United States, which 
was seeking hegemony.  
Let us review some cases. In 1995, Taiwan was experiencing dramatic 
economic growth and rapidly gaining presence in international society under the 
leadership of Lee Teng-hui, who became the president of the Republic of China 
(ROC), and was the first native Taiwanese to do so. In the same year, Lee made 
an unofficial visit to the US that turned out to be beneficial to both parties. This 
infuriated Chinese authorities. China repeatedly and intensely attacked Lee Teng-
hui in People’s Daily and other media from the end of July, saying Lee “agitated 
the separation” (July 24) and is a “criminal who destructed cross-strait relations” 
(July 27). 
Subsequently, Taiwan experienced its first direct presidential election campaign 
from that fall to March of the following year of 1996. The Chinese military 
continued large-scale military exercises near the Taiwan Strait during that time. 
Of course its primary objective was to intimidate those who advocated the 
independence of Taiwan under Lee Teng-hui, but it also signified a warning to 
international society including the US and Japan. However, in response the US 
deployed the USS Independence and Nimitz of the US seventh fleet to the Taiwan 
Strait after the People’s Liberation Army severely threatened Taiwan by force, 
thus containing China. It was the first time since the diplomatic normalization 
that military tensions between the US and China escalated to the point of risk of 
a military clash. This showed the world the significance of the “Taiwan issue,” 
capable of affecting the relationship between China and the US.  
After facing the US’ hardline stance and Taiwan’s all-out rejection, China tried 
to proactively improve its relationship with the US rather than confronting them 
with a harder stance. Progress was apparent in the July visit to China by Lake, 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and later in the realization 
of ARF, a foreign ministerial meeting between China and the US. As China made 
clear its effort to actively improve the relationship, President Clinton, who had 
shown a swaying diplomatic attitude toward China in his first term, responded 
positively. In his second term, he gathered strategists who prioritize engagement 
over containment, and responded to China’s call for improvement of their 
relationship. The two countries agreed on “enhancing a cooperative relationship.” 
Considering the unstable situation in March, it was a rapid restoration. At the 
end of October 1997, Jiang Zemin visited the US. There, the leaders of the two 
countries called themselves “constructive and strategic partners” for the first time, 
and started to seriously work on the development of such a framework. 
In June of the following year of 1998, Clinton visited China to reaffirm the 
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partnership.. His lecture enchanted the students in the overcrowded hall of Beijing 
University and was widely reported on television. Furthermore, Clinton mentioned 
the so-called “Three Don’ts Principles” (denial of the independence of Taiwan, 
of “two Chinas / one China and one Taiwan,” and of Taiwan’s participation in 
international institutes involving sovereign states) in his last stop of Shanghai, at 
the delight of China. The US-China summit symbolized their relationship in these 
two years and seemed to show the sign of a “new age of the collaboration between 
the US and China toward the 21st century.” However, US-China relations would 
not be so simple. In the latter half of 1998, Chinese authorities cracked down on 
and contained movements of democratization, including the foundation of the 
Democracy Party of China, in response to which the US expressed discomfort. 
In 1999, China criticized the US in turn when NATO’s military operation in 
Yugoslavia was decided upon under US initiative. Yugoslavia was complicated 
by the Kosovo Conflict and other factors: US bombs hit the embassy of China in 
Yugoslavia killing several people. Meanwhile, anti-Chinese sentiment in the US 
intensified after a case of alleged theft of US missile technology by Chinese was 
revealed in the US. However, Chinese authorities tried to contain public anti-US 
sentiments in order to settle the situation once again. This signified the practice of 
“diplomacy of benefit” based on the policy of Taoguang Yanghui. 
The US-China relationship further deteriorated after George W. Bush took 
office. Bush criticized Clinton’s “partnership with China” during his presidential 
campaign in 2000, declaring that “China is a competitor.” In response, China 
practiced increased caution, appointing Yang Jiechi who had known Bush’s father 
as Chinese Ambassador to the US in January 2001, right after the inauguration 
of Bush. In March, China had Vice Prime Minister Qian Qichen visit the US to 
actively seek the establishment of collaborative relations. However, in April, 
a US reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet collided above Hainan 
Island and caused the death of a Chinese pilot and forced detention of American 
crew members. It heightened tensions between the US and China. China tried to 
maintain its “mianzi” (face) by demanding an apology from the US, but the US 
did not respond right away. However, the US, whose crew members were detained 
as hostages, eventually expressed that it was “very sorry” for the death of the 
Chinese pilot, and the incident was closed without further discussion about the 
course or compensation. It was a core issue extremely important for China as it 
dealt with “Taiwan” and “security,” and though China could have taken a hardline 
stance, their actions were extremely low-key. Again, they were following the 
practice of Taoguang Yanghui with the US.
This attitude can be clearly observed in Hu Jintao period activity as well, 
though there are some contextual differences. For example, in November 2003, 
Zheng Bijian, a diplomatic brain of Hu Jintao, expressed that the development 
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of China embodied “Peaceful Rise” (Heping Jueqi) as the rest of the world felt 
a heightened sense of alert and caution toward China for their expansion in 
economy and military power.11 Of course, Zheng’s intention was to appease their 
wariness. However, developed Western countries such as the US recognized 
that the use of the word “rise” implied a change to the current international 
order, and thus regarded China as a danger to challenge it. Aware of this, China 
removed this expression from official diplomatic documents without showing 
any special attachment to the use of the term “Peaceful Rise” and announced it 
would embrace the long-used term “Peace and Development.” Had China been 
prioritizing “diplomacy of form” and been fixated on its mianzi, it would not have 
backed off.  
5) Shift in Taoguang Yanghui Policy and the Emergence of the “G2 Theory”
Today, China is showing significant changes in its diplomatic positioning, 
especially since surpassing Japan in GDP to become the world’s second largest 
economy through the success of the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 and 
Shanghai Expo in 2010. 
The current leader Xi Jinping seems to be emphasizing “form” once again. 
Wang Yizhou, Deputy Dean of the School of International Studies at Beijing 
University who has a certain influence on foreign policies of the current regime, 
argues about the “dignity of superpower diplomacy” as follows: “First, the 
diplomacy with the dignity of a superpower is definitely not the same as mere 
iron-fist politics in reality…Second, the diplomacy with the dignity of a superpower 
is not about being overly assertive…the dignity of a true superpower is created 
by internal solidity, powerful system, extraordinary and comprehensive national 
power, reputation from outside and the interaction of these elements.” He is harsh 
on his own country saying China does not have the dignity of a true superpower 
yet.12 Although his analysis was made in the early 2000s when China started to 
see itself as a superpower, this represents the country’s obsession with “form” 
regarding superpower diplomacy. 
China’s “form” based on its recent self-awareness as a superpower is 
represented in the G2 theory. In the past, China explained the ideal post-Cold 
War international order based on the multipolar theory. However, it started to 
advocate the G2 theory which focuses on two nations of the US and China. Yan 
11 Bijian Zheng, “Zhongguo heping jueqi xin daolu he yazhou de weilai” [Emergence of 
China’s New Peace Road and Asia’s Future], paper presented in the main hall of Boao Forum 
at the Asia Annual Conference, Wenhui bao [Wenhui Daily] (March 21, 2004).
12 Wang Yizhou, Chugoku gaiko no shin shiko [New Thinking in Chinese Diplomacy], trans. 
Satoshi Amako and Rumi Aoyama (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2007), 106-107.
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Xuetong became an active proponent of this theory. In an interview with the 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun in September 2011, he said, “Today’s international society 
can be represented in one character, ‘Luan’ (chaos). Clashes are continuing not 
only in developed countries but in the Middle East, too…However, the trend of 
international society is not multipolarization but bipolarization of China and the 
US.”13 Also, in December 2012, he compared the diplomacy of Xi Jinping with 
that of Hu Jintao: “In the next two years, the foreign policies will be completely 
different. In the past, the US maintained unipolar domination, but the world 
will shift to the bipolarization of China and the US. China will face the issue 
of national security more than ever…It will prioritize security interests over 
economic interests.”14 This is clearly different from the world order based on 
the “multipolar theory” that China consistently supported after the Cold War. 
Yan Xuetong was one of the Chinese members of the Japan-China Friendship 
Committee for the 21st century, but has become a representative figure of 
hardliners in diplomatic policy today.
Such a change in diplomatic attitude can be interpreted as a subtle yet 
significant shift in Deng Xiaoping’s Taoguang Yanghui route. Following the 
increase of economic and military power and the elevation of self-awareness 
as a superpower among political leaders, brains, scholars and young people, 
some started to voice that Taoguang Yanghui should be abandoned. Against 
this backdrop, the Eleventh Diplomatic Envoy Conference was called in July 
2009, and Hu Jintao gave the direction “Jianchi ‘Taoguang Yanghui,’ Jiji Yousuo 
Zuowei” ( 堅持韜光養晦、積極有所作為 , firmly maintain Taoguang Yanghui and 
aggressively deliver the results). This implied that China would maintain Deng 
Xiaoping’s policy while taking a more aggressive diplomatic attitude. The US-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue was held around the same time, and the 
Obama administration seemed even more proactive to energize China and create 
the atmosphere for the arrival of “the US-China period.”
Also, China insisted on “core interests” in the territorial disputes with countries 
in the South China Sea, and strongly opposed them. In Japan-China relations, 
China showed an extremely hardline diplomatic attitude over the incident in 
September 2010 in which a Chinese trawler collided with Japanese Coast Guard 
patrol boats; it summoned the Japanese Ambassador to Beijing at midnight, and 
communication and tourism was discontinued in all fields. Wang Jisi, Dean of the 
School of International Studies at Beijing University and one of the top brains of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a moderate realist, maintained that Taoguang 
Yanghui is still valid in a sense that it means “things should be proceeded with 
13 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 4, 2011.
14 Asahi Shimbun, December 12, 2012.
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in a discreet manner” in his paper in early 2011.15 However, he changed the tone 
to a more aggressive one after Japan’s nationalization of the Senkaku Islands 
in September of the following year of 2012, saying, “Now, the occasion to use 
Taoguang Yanghui is only limited to when we refer to the attitude toward the 
US.”16 Considering his position as a diplomatic brain, one can assume that this 
interpretation of Taoguang Yanghui originated from a basic decision of the 
Chinese government.  
Yan Xuetong, a hardliner on foreign policy, insisted in the above interview 
with the Nihon Keizai Shimbun that China should behave as a superpower in a 
dignified manner when it deals with other countries including Japan, and those 
countries have to accept it. He then added, “superpowers and small countries 
have different rights and responsibilities depending upon their national power. 
The leadership of leading countries dictates the direction of internalization of 
international norms and its speed. Therefore, conflicts should be prevented (the 
order should be maintained) by moderate hierarchy…The future international 
order is the bipolarization of China and the US. The US will be China’s 
competitor, while Japan will be inferior to China in terms of national power. Thus, 
if Japan identifies itself as a member of Western countries, it will be the enemy 
of China. If it regards itself as a member of Asia, it should accept the hierarchy 
topped by China and behave accordingly.”17
At the end of 2012, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Zhijun, who 
was supposed to be the next Minister of Foreign Affairs back then, called for 
“establishing a new and creative superpower relationship of the 21st century with 
the US” when he shared the outlook on China’s diplomacy for 2013. On the other 
hand, with regard to the relationship with Japan, he said only, “I hope Japan will 
seriously work on the improvement and development of the bilateral relationship 
with concrete actions…based on three historical documents.” He did not make 
any suggestion as to what kind of relationship should be constructed as in past 
discussions with the use of phrases such as “the establishment of partnership 
with friendly cooperation” or “reestablishment of mutually beneficial relationship 
based on common strategic interests.”18
Zhang Zhijun’s comments represented the character of the party leadership’s 
global strategy after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. 
They consistently refused to engage in dialogue with Japan to compromise on the 
15 Jisi Wang, Zhongguo de guoji dingwei wenti yu “ taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei”de 
zhanlve sixiang [The Issue of China’s Position in the World and the Strategy Concept of Self-
restraint, Modest Operations], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Studies], Vol. 2 (2011): 8.
16 Asahi Shimbun, October 5, 2012.
17 Asahi Shimbun, December 12, 2012, morning edition.
18 Xinhuanet, December 28, 2012.
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“Senkaku Islands Dispute.” Meanwhile, they proposed to the US that it “construct 
a new and creative relationship of superpowers” in the meeting between Obama 
and Xi Jinping in June 2013. Despite this, China sent Vice Foreign Minister Li 
Baodong to attend the Foreign Ministers’ Conference of Japan, China and Korea 
in APEC held in October of the same year. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
did not attend the meeting, but Japanese and Korean foreign ministers did. This 
might have marked the practice of “abandoning Taoguang Yanghui” amid the 
growing distrust between Japan and China. China, which increased its influence in 
international society with increasing national power, is trying to show its presence 
to the world as a superpower that wields both Xu and Shi by putting emphasis on 
both form and benefit. 
2. The 21st Century International Order as 
  Envisioned by China 
1) Basic Philosophy of China’s Foreign Strategy under Xi Jinping 
On November 15, 2012, after the close of the 18th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, the press conference to announce the new national 
and party leaders was held. Xi Jinping, who assumed the supreme leadership 
position of general secretary of the Communist Party of China, repeatedly talked 
about the “Chinese Dream” and “The Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 
These would become Xi’s catch phrases. On November 29th of the same year, 
he passionately declared that “the greatest Chinese dream of the modern Chinese 
nation is to realize the renaissance of the Chinese nation.” Furthermore, he argued 
in the closing speech of the National People’s Congress on March 19, 2013 
that “it is essential to realize the enrichment and enhancement of the country, 
advancement of the Chinese nation and happiness of the people” to realize the 
Chinese Dream.
From the perspective of diplomacy and international strategy, these statements 
suggest his desire to clarify China’s positioning as a “super” superpower. It 
overlaps with Zhang Zhijun’s argument on the above-mentioned “outlook of 
China’s diplomacy for 2013” at the end of 2012, which said that “China and the 
US should create a new mutually respectful, cooperative, win-win relationship 
of superpowers. This is a creative undertaking that will enrich both countries and 
benefit the world.” The same argument was made by Yang Jiechi, a new member 
of the State Council, in a press conference on March 9, 2013 where he remarked 
that “the US is hoping that they will create a new relationship of superpowers 
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together with China.”19 Xi officially proposed such a relationship of superpowers 
(G2) at the talk between Obama and Xi Jinping in June of the same year, and 
started to demand that the US recognize their relationship as the only relationship 
of superpowers. President Obama did not make any comment on this, but China 
would repeatedly demand it going forward. 
In this meeting between Obama and Xi Jinping, Xi stated, “In the Asia-Pacific 
region, there remains broad space that China and the US can share.” In March 
2007, when Keating, Commander of US Pacific Command visited China, a 
high-ranking official of the People’s Liberation Army proposed that they split 
the Pacific Ocean, with the US administering the east of Hawaii while China 
administers the west. This motion created controversy among related nations and 
experts.20 Although there exists a scheme to split the world into the West and Asia-
Africa, China seems to strategically see it as an important step in creating a fait 
accompli of “two super superpowers.” 
The way China treated the relationship with Japan is quite a contrast to the 
one with the US. In October 2013, Japanese elder statesmen including former 
Prime Minister Fukuda gathered in Beijing and had a meeting with Chinese 
senior officials in order to break the stalemate in the bilateral relationship. In the 
meeting, Tang Jiaxuan, chairman of the China-Japan Friendship Association (and 
a former member of State Council) insisted that “Japan should clarify whether it 
stands on the Western world or Asia.”21 This is in line with the above comment by 
Yan Xuetong and is related to the idea of a “Greater China Zone” that China has 
been promoting as it extends its influence in economics, politics, culture and the 
military. This idea elucidates China’s vision for the new order of the Asian world (to 
be discussed in the last section of this article.) Meanwhile, many remarks made 
by Chinese leaders, especially Xi Jinping, seem to emphasize the uniqueness of 
China by including expressions and terms from Chinese classic literature about 
governance, order and relationship. “Xiaokang Shehui” (小康社会 moderately 
prosperous society) and “Hexie Shijie” (和諧世界 harmonious world) are some 
examples. For a fuller understanding, next will follow a discussion on how current 
Chinese leaders view order, governance and international relationships from the 
context of traditional Chinese philosophy.  
2) Traditional Concept of Order 
First, it is important to define “order.” According to the authoritative Encyclopedia 
of Political Science (Seijigaku Jiten) (Akira Nakamura, Masao Maruyama and 
19 People’s Daily Online, March 9, 2013.(Japanese version).
20 Yomiuri Shimbun, March 12, 2008.
21 Asahi Shimbun, October 31, 2013.
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Kiyoaki Tsuji, eds., Heibonsha) in Japan, the definition of “order” is as follows. 
“Statically, it refers to a certain balance in which people in a society and various 
social, cultural elements have relationships and positions with certain regularity 
in the relationship with the whole society or between each other. Dynamically, 
it refers to a situation in which the behavior of people in a society is almost 
fixed based on experience. In other words, it refers to a situation where certain 
regularity and formality of social behavior exist.” In simpler words, it means a 
situation in which stability is maintained by certain relationships, functions and 
norms among people both statically and dynamically.  
How Chinese people have traditionally perceived such order can be summarized 
in the expression of “Xiushen Qijia Zhiguo Pingtianxia” (修身斉家治国平天下 , 
cultivate one’s moral character, then regulate the family, rule the state, and create 
a prosperous and peaceful country). This is an expression from Daxue (The Great 
Learning), one of the four Confucius Classics, which also wrote “Wuge erhou 
zhizhi, zhizhi erhou yicheng, yicheng erhou xinzheng, xinzheng erhou shenxiu, 
shenxiu erhou jiaqi, jiaqi erhou guozhi, guozhi erhou tianxiaping”（ 物格而後知至、
知至而後意誠、意誠而後心正、心正而後身修、身修而後家斉、家斉而後国治、国治
而後天下平）.It means if one understands principles, perfects the knowledge, has 
the sense to tell good from evil, behaves with integrity and lives in a respectable 
manner, his families and organizations can be in order.� The philosophies behind 
this are the following: 1) Order pertains to policymakers. If they cultivate 
themselves, nurture insights and master the mind frame to deal with their families 
and subordinates, they can govern the country and create a peaceful world; 2) 
the way of governance does not differ due to spatial or territorial differences 
including families, regions, countries and worlds but they are all connected as a 
homogeneous body. 
The Doctrine of the Mean has almost the same description as to the formation 
of order which maintains a stable family relationship and society, but it also 
includes more detailed laws: “Fanwei Tianxia Guojiayou Jiujing, Yi, Xiushenye, 
Zunxianye, Qinqinye, Jing Dachenye, Ti Quchenye, Zi Shuminye, Lai Baigongye, 
Rou Yuanrenye, Huai Zhuhouye” ( 凡為天下国家有九経、曰、修身也、尊賢也、親
親也、敬大臣也、體群臣也、子庶民也、来百工也、柔遠人也、懐諸侯也 All who rule 
the nation should follow nine standard rules: 1) cultivate their own characters; 2) 
honor men of virtue and talents; 3) have affection toward their relatives; 4) respect 
great ministers; 5) consider the feelings of all officers; 6) love their people as their 
own children; 7) encourage the resort of all classes of artisans; 8) treat travelers 
and merchants from afar kindly; 9) cherish the princes of the states. If they follow 
these rules, the world will be peaceful and well-governed).22 Again, the root of 
22 Daigaku Chuyo [The Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean] (Tokyo: Iwanami 
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governance is policymakers, or the rule of men. 
The following is a summary of the characteristics of the governance described 
in those Chinese classics. First, the core element of good governance is that the 
leader (ruler) masters and executes proper behavior, mindset and relationships 
with his people. This governance follows a so-called “rule of virtue.” Second, 
to realize effective governance all decisions are concentrated on the ruler. In the 
direct democracy of ancient Greek city-states, although participants were limited, 
policies were decided upon with the participation of the general population. 
There were decision-making mechanisms that involved the public and the ruled 
in other areas as well. In South East Asia, decision-making systems through 
traditional discussions used to exist in mutual assistant mechanisms, and “Gotong 
Royong” in Indonesia is one of them. China and Japan had systems of “Yoriai” 
(gathering) in agricultural communities. On the other hand, in Confucian 
governance, the citizenry were not considered as participants in the decision-
making process although they were the subject of consideration and love. In that 
sense, the mechanism of this governance was completely different from that of 
other governance types. Third, its theory of order was based on human feelings, 
emotions and reason, and did not put much focus on methods of creating rules and 
systems. It assumed that the ruled naturally follow the ruler by showing loyalty, 
integrity and justice because of the ruler’s virtue, compassion and integrity. 
In that sense, it deviated from the philosophies and thoughts about systems of 
governance in ancient Greece and Rome. In Europe, discussions about nation, 
order and governance blossomed around the time of the Renaissance, and the 
theory of governance as a system was remarkably advanced by Machiavelli’s The 
Prince, the “social contract theory” by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the theory of 
“separation of powers” developed by Montesquieu and “Perpetual Peace” by Kant 
and others. However, in China, the above discussed pre-Christian classic concept 
of governance – the rule of men with centralized power – remained in the dynasty 
system without much change, and its core philosophy still exists in China even 
today. 
As is widely known, the original form of a centralized bureaucratic system was 
created in between the Spring and Autumn period and the Qin period in order to 
maintain order and realize effective governance. However, the period of Qin was 
very short, and it is said that a “bureaucratic state” was actually formed during 
the former Han period. This “bureaucratic system” went through various reforms. 
In the period of Six Dynasties that started with the Wei Dynasty, the civil-
service nomination system of “Jiupin Zhongzheng” (九品中正 , nine-rank system) 
was implemented, its purpose being to clarify the positions, authorities and 
Shoten, 1998).
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responsibilities of bureaucrats. However, the system did not achieve this original 
purpose, and local ruling families started to take on the roles of central government 
officers and nobles. To replace this system, the civil service examination system 
of “Keju Zhidu”（科挙制度）was introduced in the Sui period. After this, the 
bureaucratic system was refined and systematized in the periods of Tang and 
Song, and became the biggest governing structure to support the Emperor.23 
However, bureaucrats were directly appointed by the Emperor based on personal 
relationships with him and were asked to show absolute obedience. Huang 
Zongyi, a philosopher of the late Ming and early Qing periods, wrote in “Mingyi 
Daifanglu” that China’s traditional bureaucratic system is founded upon “Tianxia 
Buneng Yirenerzhi, Jishe Guanyi Zhizhi, Shiguanzhe Fenshen Zhijunye” (天下不
能一人而治、即設官以治之、是官者分身之君也 , The country cannot be governed 
only by one person. Therefore officers were created who govern the country. The 
officers are the alter ego of the ruler). He also argued that “Subjects exist for the 
Emperor” on another occasion.24
Let us look back on the history of the People’s Republic of China. Liu Shaoqi, 
who was deemed the successor of Mao Zedong in the party, wrote the famous 
“On the Self-Cultivation of Communists.” Of course it was full of Marxist-
Leninist rhetoric, but the concept of “the self-cultivation as a party member” is 
based on the above-discussed idea of the traditional Confucian ruler. Also, during 
the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s political enemies were criticized for their classic 
philosophies and arguments, the biggest target being Confucius and Confucianism. 
After Lin Biao fell from power, he was condemned for hanging the calligraphy 
of “Keji Fuli” ( 克己復礼 , exercising self-restraint and conforming to the rules of 
etiquette and formality), the words of Mencius. Also, the “Gang of Four” chose 
Zhou Enlai as the target of attack after Linbiao, and they initiated the movement 
of “Pilin Pikong” (批林批孔 , Zhou Enlai is a modern Confucius). Meanwhile, Mao 
Zedong reappraised Shi Huangdi, the first Qing emperor, conducting himself as an 
“emperor,” making final decisions autocratically with little heed to the hierarchy, 
rules and guidelines accepted by the Communist Party.  
3) View of Order in Relations with the World outside China 
The framework to create and maintain order was secured by a government 
of men and a government of bureaucrats. The former refers to the relationship 
between the Emperor, who provides compassion and virtue to subjects, and 
his subjects who serve him with loyalty and justice. The latter was a system 
23 Chuyo [The Doctrine of the Mean] (Tokyo: Kodansha), 125-126.
24 Etienne Balazs, Chugoku bunmei to kanryosei [Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy], 
trans. Yuji Matsumura (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1971); John King Fairbank, Chugoku ue [China, 
Volume 1], trans. Chuzo Ichiko (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1972).
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of bureaucrats specializing in operations to govern the country and officers 
dispatched by the central government. However, this framework was limited to 
a central area ruled by central officers (内臣 Neichen) subject to the Emperor, 
and its peripheral areas governed by local officers (外臣 Waichen). The dynasty 
system was limited to the region subject to direct control, and this framework 
did not apply to the relationship with so-called “Yidi” (夷地 ethnic tribes). This is 
understandable, however, as a Yidi consists of people in “Huawai,”( 華夷 ) areas 
not influenced by Chinese culture. The relationship between Yidi and the Chinese 
Emperor was a tributary relationship in which peripheral countries pay tribute to 
the Emperor for his virtue and the Emperor gives them imperial gifts in return. 
The gifts were worth several times as much as the tributes, and greatly benefited 
peripheral countries. However, tributary relationships do not necessarily require 
lord-vassal relationships, and they existed even under equal relationships (such as 
the relationship between Japan and Sui/Tang during the Nara and Heian periods.) 
Other than tributary relationships, there were relationships of “Jarlig” in which 
the Emperor awards the leaders of peripheral countries with titles, nomination 
letters and seals while the peripheral countries show submission to the Emperor 
to establish nominal lord-vassal relationships. Jarlig, or “sakuhoutaisei”（冊封体
制） in Japanese (coined by Sadao Nishijima) refers to the relationship between 
suzerain states and tributary states as well as to traditional orders in East Asia 
created by such a relationship. Under Jarlig, there was an obvious hierarchy 
of authority between suzerain states and tributary states as represented by the 
kowtow in meetings with the Emperor. Tributary states were assured a peaceful 
relationship with the Chinese dynasty by clarifying their positions in the hierarchy. 
It also served as a method of security because this relationship sent a message to 
external parties that these countries were under the protection of the Emperor. 
The relationship between Yidi of peripheral countries and the Emperor was 
fundamentally different from the governance within China in regards to such 
notions as the rule of virtue and rule of bureaucrats. However, its psychological 
and formal structure was an extension of those of China because it was based on 
the Emperor’s authoritative hierarchy, and Yidi received the Emperors’ favor by 
showing their submission to him. The governance spread in a manner of concentric 
circles when viewing from above, and conical shape from the side. Such structure 
is expressed as “Dayitong” (大一統 respect for unity). However, the Qing Dynasty 
did not directly control Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet and Qinghai when they were 
put under control. It controlled them indirectly by creating a supervising agency 
of the central government called “Lifan Yuan”（理藩院）. Of course it was out 
of the Emperor’s direct control, but it differed from the relationship between the 
Emperor and Yidi. This governance style was somewhere in between those two. 
Regardless, including this indirect control, the Chinese dynasty’s hierarchical 
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and authoritative order follows “the order of the king.” while some other Chinese 
scholars including Wang Ke indicate that China’s current conception of the 
nation is “Tianxia Guojia” (天下国家 , state under heaven) as opposed to “Guomin 
Guojia” (nation state).25
Certainly it would be a mistake to understand China’s current view of the 
international order on the basis of the above traditional framework. China has an 
extremely strong sense of national sovereignty, territory and nationalism because 
its sovereignty and territory have been threatened, especially in modern history 
after the Opium War. Therefore, it proactively defends the current international 
order based on the system of nation states. A typical example is the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence concluded between China and India in 1954, which was 
mentioned in Chapter One. The establishment of this does not mean that China 
fully supports the framework of the current international order. In 2009, Wang Jisi 
insisted, “The current international regime basically favors China…However, it 
is also true that there are some disadvantages. We have to demand for changes in 
those areas.”26 We can infer that China started drafting a vision for its future by 
itself while it was gaining power. 
For example, Chinese leaders have been plying traditional Chinese words 
and expressions in comments and writings for the past dozen years or so, as was 
already discussed. What might this mean? Meng Jianjun took note that Deng 
Xiaoping used the word “Xiaokang” (basically well-off) to describe the goal of 
the reform and open policies. Xiaokang is derived from Liji; Liyun (Book of 
Rites; Chapter of the Conveyance of Rites), a Confucian classic, and refers to the 
social phase prior to achieving the ideal state of “Datong” (Great Unity). Meng 
wrote, “The word Xiaokang appears more than 40 times in Volume II and III of 
Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Writings of Deng Xiaoping) and he often used 
expressions such as ‘Xiaokang Zhijia’ (home), ‘Xiaokang Shuizhun’ (standard), 
‘Xiaokang Shehui’ (society) and ‘Xiaokang Guojia’ (nation). China put forward 
the concept of ‘Xiaokang Shehui.’ I see it as a milestone that China finally cast 
off the curse of the Western ideology that tormented Chinese people throughout 
the 20th century and it has an important significance for the future development 
of China.”27 He candidly confesses that the Western ideology was a “curse” for 
Chinese elites. From this, it can be observed that he has a strong desire to return to 
original Chinese ideology going forward.
25 Morimitsu Shimizu, Shina shakai no kenkyu [Study of Chinese Society] (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1939), 89, 95.
26 Ke Wang, Chugoku bunka hyakka dai 13 kan: “ Tenka” wo mezashite – Chugoku taminzoku 
kokka no ayumi [Encyclopedia of Chinese Culture, Volume 13: Aiming for “Unification” – 
China, History of a Multiethnic Country] (Tokyo: Rural Culture Association, 2007).
27 “Chugoku gaiko burein ga kataru kokusai senryaku to nihon” [International Strategy and 
Japan as told by the Brain of China’s Diplomacy] China Net (March 30, 2009).
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4) Theory of the Modern World Order based on Traditional Concepts 
China has gone through the world of the Cold-War structure and the post Cold-
War structure since the founding of the nation. China’s own world vision has 
been presented in the Intermediate Zone Theory of Mao Zedong and its enhanced 
version of the Three Worlds Theory, the theory of the New International Political 
and Economic Order (hereinafter referred to as the Theory of New International 
Order) during the Deng Xiaoping period and the theory of Harmonious (Hexie) 
World proposed by Hu Jintao. Although the details of the Three Worlds Theory 
have already been discussed in some sections of this article, Sun Longji made a 
noteworthy argument as follows in the context of traditional philosophies: “The 
framework of the theory of Three Worlds is not necessarily based on analysis 
of the national characteristics and world affairs from a Marxist perspective. It is 
rather a concept to incorporate all other countries into the centric zone with China 
in its center based on the closeness of relationships. The framework of the Three 
Worlds does not play a significant role in World Revolution or People’s Liberation 
Movement of the Third World. It turned out to be the criteria to determine the 
treatment when China greets foreign visitors.”28 Sun also made an appropriate 
and insightful argument about China’s way of recognizing international society, 
saying, “When a big circle called China faces the outside world, it tends to put 
itself in the center and categorize others in a hierarchical manner based on the 
proximity with itself. This hierarchy creates the order of ‘grades’ and serves for 
the process of ‘classifications.’”29
This article has already mentioned the theory of the New International Order 
presented by Deng Xiaoping and later advocated by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. 
It is based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence agreed upon in the 
talk between Zhou Enlai and Nehru in 1955 and confirmed in the first Asian-
African Conference in the following year. However, it might be possible to say 
that the theory of the New International Order put special emphasis on “creating 
fair, reasonable and equal relationships regardless of the country’s size, wealth 
or power” as an extension of the Three Worlds Theory which positioned China 
as a “weak” country and implied solidarity with poor and weak Asian-African 
countries. This notion is also supported by the fact that China started to advocate 
“Taoguang Yanghui” around the same time.  
The theory of Harmonious (Hexie) World, first proposed by Hu Jintao in the 
28 Jianjun Meng, 2020nen zenmen teki shoko shakai he no tenbo [Vision for an Overall 
Stable Society by 2020], Keizai sangyo kenkyujo discussion paper [The Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, Discussion Paper] (April 2012), 2, 4.
29 Longji Sun, Zhongguo wenhua de “ shenceng jiegou” [The “Deep Structure” of China’s 
Culture], 364.
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Asian African summit held in Jakarta in April 2005, uses a traditional expression 
in a more direct manner. Hu also made a speech titled “Making Great Efforts to 
Build a Harmonious World with Long-lasting Peace and Common Prosperity” at 
the summit on the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations 
held on September 15th of the same year. The original meaning of Hexie is to create 
a harmony with different melodies that produce beautiful sounds. “Harmonious 
World” explained in Hu Jintao’s speech covers four points: He called for 1) 
realizing common security by maintaining polycentrism; 2) maintaining mutually 
beneficial cooperation to realize common prosperity; 3) working together to 
build a Harmonious World by maintaining the spirit of engagement; and 4) 
maintaining proactive and stable policies to promote United Nations reform. 
Furthermore, Hu Jintao described Harmonious World thusly in the “Zhengzhi 
Baogao” (political report) on the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China on October 15, 2007: Harmonious World covers politics, economy, 
culture, security and environment conservation. It is essential to “work together to 
promote mutual respect, equal cooperation and democratization of international 
relations in the area of politics,” “realize equal benefits, balanced global economy, 
strong countries’ support for weak countries and mutual cooperation in the area 
of economy,” “learn from each other, seek big commonalities while keeping 
small differences, respect the diversity of the world and work together to advance 
and bring prosperity to human civilizations in the area of culture” and “realize 
international peace through mutual respect, and enhancement of cooperation 
not by war but by peaceful means in the area of security.” Hu insists that in 
order to realize that “it is necessary to treat all countries as equal regardless of 
size, power or wealth, respect the right of people to voluntarily choose the path 
for the development of their own countries, not interfere with other countries’ 
internal affairs and not force one’s purpose on others.” It was an ambitious 
proposal to create a harmonious world by leveraging the uniqueness of diverse 
actors. However, this argument itself was not totally novel and shared quite a 
few similarities with conventional idealism such as principles of international 
cooperation and self-determination developed by Wilson.  
However, around 2010, the academic society of international studies in China 
took up active discussion on the necessity and rise of a new international system in 
the 21st century, one vastly different from the conventional one, to react to China’s 
gross domestic product overtaking that of Japan, and Xi Jinping’s coming to power 
with his “Chinese Dream” ideology. In this dialogue, the current international 
structure is regarded as a force to be overcome, with China positioned as a leader 
to build a new international system while discussing a more desirable international 
society built upon a Chinese traditional framework and philosophies. Examples 
of this academic discussion include “Post-Western International System and the 
China’s Diplomatic Philosophy and View of the International Order in the 21st Century
28 The Journal of Contemporary China Studies, Vol.3, No. 2
Rise of the East”30 by Professor Zhang Jianxin of Fudan University, “International 
Principles of Confucius and Construction of Modern International Relations”31 
by Yu Li and Dong Wenbo of Zhengzhou University, and “Balance, Integration 
and Leadership – China’s Role in the Construction of the New World Order.”32 by 
Wang Shuang of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. 
Zhang Jianxin maintains that the Western international system in place since 
the 1600s will gradually decline with the end of the 20th century as powers of 
the eastern world rise and grow. He characterized the conventional international 
system as follows: 1) persistent hegemonic system; 2) unequal development 
among major actor states; 3) fierce competition among leadership nations over 
the allocation of power under a hegemonic system; and 4) Western countries’ 
overwhelming control of non-Western countries. In the 21st century, global 
power is obviously shifting east with the rise of emerging powers such as BRICS 
and stagnating economies of the US and Europe as represented by the Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy and subsequent financial crisis. Meanwhile, China has 
already gained global power and insists this fact is supported by a number of 
factors: its social political system that ensures domestic stability and economic 
growth, a unique development model, the world’s number two economy, third 
largest territory and biggest population in the world, as well as its permanent seat 
in the UN Security Council, possession of nuclear power, a traditional culture 
with a 5,000 year history and cohesive power. China even claims that its mission 
to shift to a post-Western international system is of an historically unprecedented 
scale. 
An article by Yu Li and Dong Wenbo also emphasizes that the international 
system since the Peace of Westphalia did not completely abolish hegemonism, 
iron-fist politics or wars of aggression although it did give rise to the international 
order that put emphasis on sovereign equality, conflict prevention and 
humanitarianism. With this in mind, they discuss the significance of Confucius’ 
view. In the Warring States period, Confucius spread the concept of “Li” (courtesy) 
to restore order by preaching “Junshichenyili, Chenshijunyizhong” (The monarch 
should rule his vassals with courtesy, and vassals should serve their monarch with 
loyalty), and discussed the importance of harmony. Yu and Dong argue that the 
Confucian philosophy of “respecting morals and disregarding interests” is the 
30 Ibid., 263.
31 Zhang Jianxin, “Houxifang guojiti yu dongdang de qinqi” [Post-western international 
system and the rise of East], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], No. 5 
(2012): 4-20.
32 Yu li and Dong Wenbo, “Kongzi guojiajian daoyi sixiang yu dangdai guojiguanxi jiangou” 
[International Principles of Confucius and Construction of Modern International Relations], 
Guoji guanxi xueyuan xuebao [Journal of the University of International Relations], Vol. 3 
(2012): 13-19.
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dominant view of today’s international order, effectively containing hegemonism 
and addressing today’s global issues such as worsening environment, terrorism 
and the polarization of rich and poor, as many similarities are observed between 
today’s multipolar international system and the world during the Warring States 
period, despite the environmental differences between modern and ancient times.    
It is not difficult to understand the feelings of many Chinese elites who make 
such statements considering that China is now overwhelming other countries at 
a furious speed, even after being humiliated by the invasion of superpowers in 
modern history. However, their arguments are self-righteous and baseless claims 
as they fail to explain whether traditional Chinese philosophies indeed possess 
the merits outlined above. Modern China originally started with the May Fourth 
movement which criticized Confucius and labeled Confucianism as the cause of 
long stagnation during the dynasty era. Deng Xiaoping tried to create a “wealthy 
China” by studying modernization and industrialization in advanced countries 
and overcoming Mao Zedong’s traditional peasant revolution. It is inappropriate 
to discuss China’s economic development by conflating or confusing the “China 
model” with traditional Confucianism. Such an argument betrays the fact that 
China itself practiced universal industrialization and modernization while 
Chinese elements were simply mixed in. If they believe that Confucianism is 
the very philosophy to solve all issues in modern society, China should take the 
opportunity to effect a reformed version of Confucianism in its own country, 
where environmental destruction, the rich-poor gap and corruption are prevalent.  
Even if there were Chinese scholars who accept this counterargument, some 
would say that “creative thinking” of Confucianism in international society should 
not be denied. Many Chinese intellectuals interpret the Western view of the 
international order as “Badao” (覇道 hegemonic way) and counter it with Chinese-
style international order based on “Wangdao” ( 王道 king’s way) of Confucianism, 
which they idealize. In 1995, the “Japan-China Academic Exchange Conference” 
hosted by the Japan Association for Asian Studies and Institute of Japanese 
Studies of CASS was held in Beijing while the China Threat Theory was gaining 
momentum following an increase of military power and a daring nuclear test. 
In the meeting, Feng Zhaokui, Vice Director of the Institute of Japanese Studies 
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who was known to be well-versed 
on Japan, asserted that “China does not take Badao, but it will take Wangdao. 
Therefore, other countries should rest assured.” Against this, I argue, “It concerns 
us because the idea of Wangdao itself assumes hierarchical authority.” Today, 
China has a stronger sense of superpower and more Chinese intellectuals insist 
that China should take Wangdao by positioning itself as the supreme power in the 
world. 
Then, what is the picture of the new international order drawn by today’s 
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Chinese elites besides the theory of Wangdao? Wang Shuang made some 
interesting observations in the aforementioned “Balance, Integration and 
Leadership – China’s Role in the Construction of the New World Order.” He 
argues that important concepts for the new world order in the future are 1) 
balance, 2) integration, and 3) leadership. Balance refers to the coordination of 
relations among superpowers. Fusion means the creation of regional mechanisms. 
Leadership serves to provide new models and ideas to establish future order. 
It is certain that the leadership under Xi Jinping repeatedly calls for “a new 
type of creative relationship of superpowers” between the US and China, and 
they seem to aim at striking a “balance” through mutual coordination. However, 
Wang’s article also includes the relations with Russia and Japan in “the relations 
of superpowers.” At the time of the paper’s conception in 2010, the rise of Xi 
Jinping, who clearly seeks to achieve G2 was not yet definite.  
As for “fusion,” Xi Jinping made the following statement in the above-
mentioned “Round-Table Talk on Neighboring Diplomacy” held in October 2013: 
“The strategic goals of neighboring diplomacy are to meet the target of “two one 
hundred years” (100th anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party in 
2021 and 100th anniversary of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China) 
and to serve to realize the great restoration of the Chinese race…The principle 
of neighboring diplomacy is to improve the relations with neighboring countries, 
treat them as partners, enrich them and focus on the philosophies of intimacy, 
integrity, beneficence and tolerance.”33 Intimacy, integrity, beneficence and 
tolerance are the very words used in Daxue, and “Mulin, Anlin, Banlin” ( 睦隣、安
隣、 伴 隣 ) be friendly, appease, and partner with neighbors) are the expressions 
the Chinese Dynasty used as principles of relationships with neighboring 
countries. Therefore, such neighboring diplomacy implies the strategy to expand 
China’s sphere of influence and create a “Greater China” zone. In a workshop 
33 Wang Shuang, “Pinghen, rouhe yu yingdao- shixi xieshijiechixu zhong de zhongguo 
zuoyong” [Balance, Integration and Leadership – China’s Role in the Construction of the New 
World Order] Dangdai yatai [Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], Vol. 2 (2011): 
68-86.
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between Japanese and Korean scholars held in November 2013, a Korean scholar 
of modern China shared with me that he had mixed feelings when Chinese 
participants told him that “The traditional tributary relation between Korea and 
China was not bad.” China obviously developed a view of future relations with 
neighboring countries by putting traditional philosophies in a positive light. 
The idea of this Greater China zone assumes not only the participation of 
neighboring countries attracted by the economic prosperity of China but also 
neighboring countries’ increasing dependency on China in the areas of politics, 
security and culture. It is certain that China is the largest trading partner for all 
of its neighboring countries and the conversion of Chinese yuan between China 
and currencies of those countries has been promoted. A Chinese Yuan Zone is 
now being formed. In the area of security, China is trying to expand its control 
in airspace and the waters of the East and South China Sea backed by rapidly 
increasing military power. Cooperation with Central Asian countries is expanding, 
especially in the fields of energy and counterterrorism. Moreover, China 
concluded an agreement with Ukraine to become Ukraine’s “nuclear umbrella” in 
December 2013 as Ukraine abandoned nuclear weapons.34 It might take similar 
approaches to other neighboring countries in the future. 
In order to realize China’s vision of the “Great Restoration of the Chinese 
Race,” the country needs to increase the influence of soft power. In the 21st 
century, Confucius Institutes were set up in many countries around the world 
to promote Chinese language and culture. Also, expressions such as “China 
model” in contrast with Western model, “China’s unique development” and 
“Beijing consensus” are frequently used in Chinese academia. Furthermore, the 
Center for China Development Model Research was established within Fudan 
University in 2013 as a research institute sponsored by Wang Huning, a Fudan 
University professor who rose to become a member of the Central Politburo of the 
Communist Party of China. 
Conclusion
All things considered, there seems to be a paradox here. The more China 
emphasizes the “China Model” and the theory of “China’s uniqueness,” the more 
it conflicts with the universal, widely accepted concept in international society. 
If this is the case, the world will not accept this “China model” or the theory of 
“China’s uniqueness” even if China does catch up with the US in an economic 
and military sense. As was emphasized earlier, the basic framework of China’s 
34 China Watch, November 6, 2013, 29.
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development is the path of modernization and industrialization which man, 
especially in currently developed nations, took. China took the same path by fully 
leveraging the advantages of developing countries. Professor Wu Jianlian, an elder 
of Chinese economic science, and many other Chinese scholars are well aware of 
this fact.35
If China accepts the reality as it is, appreciates the importance of man’s 
universal values and framework, and contributes to a new symbiotic international 
order required by all members in international society by succeeding and further 
developing the current international order, rather than creating a new international 
order to replace the current one, international society would welcome it. Actually, 
China itself has expressed the need for such a framework rather consistently.  
An enhanced version of such a model can be observed in Hu Jintao’s “Zhengzhi 
Baogao” (political report) from the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China in November 2012. He said, “there is only one earth for human beings, 
and many countries coexist in one world. The history explicitly shows us that the 
law of the jungle does not lead to human coexistence, and that injudicious use of 
force does not create a beautiful world.”36 This statement positions China’s path of 
survival in the current international order. Hu Jintao continued: “We advocate the 
spirit of equality, mutual trust, tolerance, mutual learning, cooperation and ‘win-
win’…Equality and mutual trust mean to maintain equality regardless of the size, 
strength and wealth of the nation and protect world peace and order by following 
the principles and philosophy of the UN Charter. Tolerance and mutual learning 
mean to respect the diversity of civilizations and development paths, support 
the rights of people to choose the path of development and social systems by 
themselves in any country, learn from each other, and promote the advancement of 
human civilization. Cooperation and ‘win-win’ mean to advocate the idea that all 
humans share the same destiny, pay attention to other countries’ legal rights while 
pursuing his/her own country’s interests, work together to overcome difficulties, 
share rights and responsibilities, and increase common benefits.” This is in line 
with the claim China has been making since the end of the Cold War while more 
emphasis was put on the principle of international collaboration. In this argument, 
he actively advocates an international strategy to which China should contribute 
from the universal perspective, not from the perspective of the theory of “China’s 
uniqueness.” 
It is essential that Chinese leaders and intellectuals fully reflect on the former 
Chairman’s last official speech and practice it with integrity and establish a new 
international order accepted and respected by other countries. If China can lead 
35 People’s Daily , December 6, 2013.
36 Asahi Shimbun, January 6, 2012.
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that movement, it would fulfill the first criterion to becoming a true world leader. 
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